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IS WHAT YOU GIVE, REALLY WHAT YOU GET? THE EFFECT 
OF GOLAN V. HOLDER ON THE DETERIORATION OF THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN 
Robert F. Kappers* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Apple Inc. had astonishing 2011 sales, including 70 million iPhones, 
30 million iPads, and 59 million other products.1  In 2008, Bloomberg 
described Apple’s late CEO Steve Jobs as the man who “helped make 
personal computers as easy to use as telephones, changed the way 
animated films are made, persuaded consumers to tune into digital 
music and refashioned the mobile phone.”2  Yes, there is no doubt Mr. 
Jobs was good, but was he that good?  After all, he did not actually 
invent the telephone,3 computer,4 or MP3 player.5  Mr. Jobs merely 
replicated these inventions—and replication is often labeled with 
negative connotations like “plagiarize,” “steal,” or “rip-off.” 
But the essence of creation and invention is to utilize old works as the 
building blocks for the new.6  Of course, no one would consider Mr. 
Jobs a second-rate copyist.  To the contrary, many consider him as one 
of the most brilliant figures in the past century.7  Mr. Jobs has helped us 
see the advantages of using the “public domain”—works whose 
intellectual property rights are inapplicable, expired, or forfeited—and 
building off that knowledge to improve upon what already exists.  Our 
 
             *   Associate Member, 2011–2012, University of Cincinnati Law Review.  
 1. Bob Evans, Apple Inc.: 10 Astonishing Facts, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2012/01/24/apple-inc-10-astonishing-facts-3/. 
 2. Matthew Moore, Steve Jobs Obituary Published by Bloomberg, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 28, 2008), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/2638481/Steve-Jobs-obituary-published-by-
Bloomberg.html. 
 3. Alexander Graham Bell is credited with inventing the telephone, and was the first to patent 
the new technology.  Who Is Credited as Inventing the Telephone?, LIBR. CONGRESS (last visited Aug. 
16, 2012), http://www.loc.gov/rr/scitech/mysteries/telephone.html; U.S. Patent No. 174,465 (filed Feb. 
14, 1876). 
 4. Konrad Zuse is credited with building the world’s first working computer, “the Z3.”  Judith 
Holzer, Konrad Zuse and the Invention of the Computer, JUDITH HOLZER. MOVIES, GRAPHICS (Oct. 
2010), http://www.judithholzer.net/Konrad-Zuse-and-the-Invention-of-the-Computer. 
 5. Kane Kramer was the inventor of the digital audio player.  See KANE KRAMER, 
http://www.kanekramer.com (last visited Aug. 16, 2012). 
 6. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (“From their 
inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote 
innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to 
invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.”). 
 7. See generally A.N. Wilson, Brilliant, Yes, But He Wasn’t an Einstein, MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 7, 
2011, 4:11 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2046237/Steve-Jobs-dead-Brilliant-yes-
wasnt-Einstein.html. 
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world would not nearly be the same without Mr. Jobs’s inventions, or 
access to the works of William Shakespeare,8 or if Detroit had to 
reinvent the wheel, literally and figuratively. 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently struck a blow to the public domain 
in Golan v. Holder.9  This Note addresses the Court’s recent decision 
upholding the constitutionality of § 514 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement Act (URAA), a federal statute permitting Congress to extend 
copyright protection to works previously in the public domain.  Part II 
provides background information on copyright and patent law, 
specifically the importance of the public domain and the recent activity 
that threatens it.  Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Golan v. Holder, and Part IV provides a discussion of how the Court 
improperly performed the balancing required by the Constitution’s 
Copyright and Patent Clause,10 setting precedent that will have a 
sweeping impact on intellectual property law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Copyright and Patent Law 
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to “promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.”11  The Copyright and Patent Clause embodies two separate 
grants of power—“first, to establish a copyright system and, second, to 
establish a patent system.”12  Furthermore, the Clause itself reflects U.S. 
copyright and patent law’s purpose of stimulating the development of 
creative works13 and encouraging technological innovation.14  As the 
Supreme Court described, “[the Copyright and Patent Clause] is 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the 
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the 
 
 8. See Jeremy Hylton, The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, TECH, 
http://shakespeare.mit.edu/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2012). 
 9. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S at 146. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 12. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“[T]he constitutionally-stated purpose of 
granting patent rights to inventors for their discoveries is the promotion of progress in the ‘useful 
Arts.’”).  Likewise, the constitutionally-stated purpose of granting copyrights to authors for their 
writings is the promotion of progress of science.  Id. 
 13. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (“As we have explained, the economic 
philosophy behind the Copyright Clause is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by 
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 14. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146. 
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products of their genius.”15 
Though the Copyright and Patent Clause has been interpreted to 
bestow upon Congress these two broad powers, the Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized that the “clause is both a grant of power and a 
limitation.”16  More specifically, the federal copyright and patent 
systems must, by “constitutional command,” “promote the Progress of 
[Science and] useful Arts” (Progress Clause).17  Additionally, Congress 
is bound by the “limited times” provision, barring it from granting 
monopolies of infinite duration18 in order to avoid “monopolies which 
stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.’”19 
The Supreme Court is well practiced in addressing the interpretation 
of Article I, Section Eight, Clause Eight, including the limited times 
provision and the Progress Clause.20  For example, in Graham v. John 
Deere Co. of Kansas City, the Court discussed the purpose of patent law 
in relation to the Copyright and Patent Clause while addressing the 
patentability requirement of non-obviousness.21  The Court stated, 
“Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to 
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free 
access to materials already available.”22  Instead, when establishing a 
copyright and patent system, Congress “by constitutional command 
must ‘promote the Progress of useful Arts’”—a standard that “may not 
be ignored.”23 
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., the Supreme Court 
 
 15. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 16. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 17. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
 18. Eldred, 537 U.S. at  204; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146. 
 19. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146. 
 20. See id.  (“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage 
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance 
in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ As we have noted in the past, the Clause contains both a 
grant of power and certain limitations upon the exercise of that power.”); Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 
(“Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent 
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.  Innovation, 
advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent 
system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’  This is the 
standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.”) (emphasis added); Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003) (“The rights of a patentee or copyright 
holder are part of a carefully crafted bargain, under which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has 
expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without attribution.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  But cf. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 (“We have also stressed, however, that it is generally for 
Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”). 
 21. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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held that federal patent law preempted a Florida statute making it 
unlawful to use a process already being used by another boat hull 
manufacturer without written permission from that manufacturer.24  In 
reaching its conclusion, the Court held the Copyright and Patent Clause 
mandates that patent law “embod[y] a careful balance between the need 
to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement 
through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very 
lifeblood of a competitive economy.”25  Thus, the Court found that the 
Florida statute ran contrary to the purpose of patent law by 
“substantially imped[ing] the public use of otherwise unprotected design 
and utilitarian ideas embodied in unpatented boat hulls.”26 
The Court has made similar remarks favoring the right to copy works 
or inventions already in the public domain in both TrafFix Devices, Inc. 
v. Marketing Displays, Inc and Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp.27  The Court in TrafFix held that a design for use in a display 
sign could be copied because it was functional and thus not protectable 
under federal trademark law.28  “Unless an intellectual property right 
such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to 
copying.”29  Likewise, in Dastar the Court held that § 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act did not support Fox’s false designation of origin claim, 
because holding otherwise “would create a species of mutant copyright 
law that limits the public’s federal right to copy and to use expired 
copyrights.”30 
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court’s tone was slightly more 
threatening to the public domain and the public’s right to copy.31  Justice 
Ginsburg, also the author of Golan v. Holder,32 wrote Eldred’s majority 
opinion, where the Court held that the Copyright Term Extension Act 
(CTEA)—an act that extended copyright duration to all future and then-
existing copyrights—was neither invalid on the basis of the Copyright 
 
 24. 489 U.S. at 146 (“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage 
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance 
in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”). 
 25. Id. “[W]e have consistently reiterated the teaching of Sears and Compco that ideas once 
placed before the public without the protection of a valid patent are subject to appropriation without 
significant restraint.”  Id. at 156. 
 26. Id. at 157. 
 27. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); TrafFix 
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 28. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29. 
 29. Id. (“[C]opying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our 
competitive economy.”). 
 30. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (internal citations omitted). 
 31. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 32. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
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and Patent Clause nor the First Amendment.33  In reaching this 
conclusion, Justice Ginsburg rejected arguments that the Act created a 
copyright term that was “virtually perpetual,”34 and instead found that 
the limited times provision of the Copyright and Patent Clause should 
not be interpreted such that a time prescription becomes forever fixed or 
inalterable.35  “The word ‘limited,’ however, does not convey a meaning 
so constricted . . . .  [A] time span appropriately ‘limited’ as applied to 
future copyrights does not automatically cease to be ‘limited’ when 
applied to existing copyrights.”36  The Court also rejected the argument 
that without further consideration from the author, extending copyright 
duration to existing copyrights “fails to promote the Progress of Science 
and ignores copyright’s quid pro quo.”37  Instead, the Court found that 
the consideration for creating works includes any benefit of later 
legislative extension of the copyright term.38 
B. The Road to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) 
In order to establish uniform international copyright relations, many 
foreign nations agreed to the Berne Convention for Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention), which took effect in 
1886.39  Berne Convention members agreed to treat authors from other 
member countries as well as they treat their own.40  Importantly, the 
Berne Convention mandates that a work must be protected abroad unless 
its copyright term has expired, either in the country where protection is 
claimed or the country of origin.41 
Late to the table, the United States became a party to the Berne 
Convention’s copyright guidelines in 1989.42  Despite becoming a 
member, the United States initially did not comply with the Berne 
Convention’s instruction that “member countries—including ‘new 
accession to the Union’—protect foreign works under copyright in the 
 
 33. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194. 
 34. Id. at 210 n.16. 
 35. Id. at 199. 
 36. Id. at 187–88.  
 37. Id. at 210 (internal numbering omitted). 
 38. See id. at 215. 
 39. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 1, Sept. 9, 1886,  S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 877 
(2012). 
 40. Berne Convention, supra note 39, at art. 5(1) (“Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for 
which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of 
origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as 
the rights specially granted by this Convention.”). 
 41. Berne Convention, supra note 39, at art. 18(1)–(2); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878. 
 42. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877. 
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country of origin.”43  Instead, Congress withheld protection to “any 
work that is in the public domain in the United States.”44  Though other 
members to the Berne Convention expressed irritation with the United 
States’ failure to enact retroactive protection,45 the Berne Convention 
did not provide a “potent enforcement mechanism.”46  To the contrary, 
the Berne Convention offered no sanctions for noncompliance and 
allowed parties to declare themselves not bound.47 
The Berne Convention grew teeth in 1994 when the United States 
joined both the World Trade Organization (WTO)48 and the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement).49  The TRIPS Agreement mandates implementation of the 
Berne Convention’s first twenty-one articles, including Article 18, 
which would require nations to retroactively grant copyright protection 
over works previously in the public domain.50  Furthermore, 
noncompliance with the TRIPS Agreement, and consequently the Berne 
Convention’s twenty-one initial articles, would render the United States 
subject to WTO enforcement including possible tariffs or cross-sector 
retaliation.51 
Congress abandoned its previous refusal to grant retroactive copyright 
protection when it passed the URAA in 1994.52  Specifically, § 514 of 
the URAA extended copyright to works protected in their countries of 
 
 43. Berne Convention, supra note 39, at art. 18(1), (4); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 879. 
 44. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 879. 
 45. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 880 (“Mexican authorities complained about the United States’ refusal 
to grant protection, in accord with Article 18, to Mexican works that remained under copyright 
domestically. . . . The Register of Copyrights also reported ‘questions’ from Turkey, Egypt, and Austria. 
Thailand and Russia balked at protecting U.S. works, copyrighted here but in those countries’ public 
domains, until the United States reciprocated with respect to their authors’ works.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 46. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 880. 
 47. Berne Convention, supra note 39, at art. 33(2)–(3). 
 48. What Is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2012) (“The World 
Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade 
between nations.  At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s 
trading nations and ratified in their parliaments.  The goal is to help producers of goods and services, 
exporters, and importers conduct their business.”). 
 49. Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2012) (“The 
WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), negotiated in the 
1986–94 Uruguay Round, introduced intellectual property rules into the multilateral trading system for 
the first time.”). 
 50. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 9(1), Apr. 14, 
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; Berne Convention, supra note 39, at art. 18. 
 51. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 881 (2012). 
 52. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 
104A, 109(a) (1994)). 
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origin that were previously in the United States’ public domain for any 
of the following three reasons: (1) lack of copyright relations between 
the country of origin and the United States at the time of publication, (2) 
lack of subject matter protection for sound recordings fixed before 1972, 
and(3) failure to comply with U.S. statutory formalities.53  Not 
surprisingly, in light of the purposes of copyright and patent law and the 
importance of the public domain, many consider § 514 to violate the 
U.S. Constitution’s Copyright and Patent Clause by pulling works out of 
the public domain—a belief that sparked the controversy in Golan v. 
Holder. 
III. GOLAN V. HOLDER 
A. Background and Procedural History 
Having previously relied extensively on the ability to utilize artistic 
works in the public domain, “orchestra conductors, educators, 
performers, publishers[,] film archivists and motion picture distributers” 
all felt the impact of § 514.54  With increased performance fees, sheet 
music rentals, and other royalties, these affected parties, including 
Lawrence Golan, a teacher and performer of works by foreign 
composers, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District 
of Colorado.55  The plaintiffs contended that both the URAA and the 
CTEA were unconstitutional,56 alleging that § 514 of the URAA (1) 
violates Congressional limitations inherent in the Copyright and Patent 
Clause, and (2) interferes with the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. 
In light of the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft,57 
where the Court rejected a nearly identical constitutional claim, the 
district court granted summary judgment to the government on the 
challenge to the CTEA.58  The district court further sided with the 
government on the claims towards the URAA, granting summary 
 
 53. Id.  See also Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 882 n.11.  A common instance of failing to comply with 
U.S. statutory formalities includes the failure to provide notice of copyright status, or to register and 
renew a copyright—“formalities [that] drew criticism as a trap for the unwary.”  Id.  Congress 
subsequently removed these formalities, making copyright protection extend to any original work “fixed 
in a tangible medium of expression.”  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).  However, there are still many incentives 
for copyright owners to register their works, including as a requirement to sue for infringement.  See 
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 882.  In 1992, Congress made renewal of copyright registration automatic for works 
that were in their first term of copyright protection.  Id. 
 54. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Golan I]. 
 55. Id. at 1182. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 537 U.S. 186, 198 (2003) (rejecting a claim that the CTEA violated the limited times 
provision of the Copyright and Patent Clause). 
 58. See Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1182. 
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judgment on both claims under the Copyright and Patent Clause and the 
First Amendment.59  The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.60 
A panel for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
the CTEA claim and the district court’s holding that § 514 did not 
exceed the limitations of the Copyright and Patent Clause.61  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court first rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
Progress Clause and the limited times provision of the Copyright and 
Patent Clause prevent Congress from copyrighting works in the public 
domain.62  Though the court recognized that its holding would permit 
Congress to adopt a “consistent practice of restoring works in the public 
domain in an effort to confer perpetual monopolies,”63 it found that this 
“troubling” situation was not before it.64  Although the Supreme Court 
in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City stated, “Congress may not 
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent 
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict knowledge from the 
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available,”65 
the Tenth Circuit reasoned that Graham did not “stand[] for the 
proposition that, in the context of copyright, the public domain is a 
threshold that Congress may not traverse in both directions.”66 
In considering the First Amendment challenge to § 514, the Tenth 
Circuit concluded that “the traditional contours of copyright protection 
include the principle that works in the public domain remain there and 
that § 514 transgresses this critical boundary,”67 demanding First 
Amendment review under the Supreme Court’s standard in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft.68  Since § 514 “implicates plaintiffs’ right to free expression,” 
the Tenth Circuit remanded the case for further First Amendment 
review.69 
On remand for First Amendment review, both parties agreed that 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 1185. 
 62. See id. at 1186. 
 63. Id. at 1186. 
 64. Id. at 1186; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.186, 209 (2003). 
 65. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966); Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1186 
(“Graham dealt with patents rather than copyright, and the ideas applicable to one do not automatically 
apply to the other.”). 
 66. Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1187 (internal quotations omitted). 
 67. Id. at 1189. 
 68. See id. at 1197; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (“We recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too 
broadly when it declared copyrights ‘categorically immune from challenges under the First 
Amendment.’  But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright 
protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”) (emphasis added). 
 69. Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1197. 
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§ 514 is a content-neutral regulation of speech, requiring the application 
of only intermediate scrutiny.70  Thus, the district court considered 
whether § 514 “advances important governmental interests unrelated to 
the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more 
speech than necessary to further those interests.”71  The court granted 
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment after concluding that “to the 
extent Section 514 suppresses the right of reliance parties to use works 
they exploited while the works were in the public domain,” § 514 was 
unconstitutional.72 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s 
analysis and instead found that § 514 was enacted to alleviate real 
economic harm to American copyright holders due to foreign countries 
refusing to provide copyright protection to American works abroad.73  
Furthermore, the court found that since “foreign 
countries . . . provide . . . only as much protection to American copyright 
holders as the United States would provide to foreign copyright 
holders,” § 514 imposes the same burden on American parties relying on 
access to public domain works as it does to foreign parties.74  Because 
“the burdens on speech are therefore directly focused to the harms that 
the government sought to alleviate,”75 the Tenth Circuit found that § 514 
withstood intermediate scrutiny and reversed the judgment of the district 
court.76 
The plaintiffs appealed the Tenth Circuit’s reversal and petitioned the 
United States Supreme Court to find § 514 is invalid under the 
Copyright and Patent Clause and the First Amendment. 
B. The United States Supreme Court 
After considering the parties’ briefs and amicus curiae briefs,77 the 
Supreme Court, in a 6–2 decision, affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s 
judgment, holding that § 514 of the URAA did not violate the Copyright 
and Patent Clause or the First Amendment because neither provision 
 
 70. See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1083 (10th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Golan II]. 
 71. Id. at 1083 (internal citations omitted). 
 72. Id. at 1082. 
 73. See id. at 1086. 
 74. Id. at 1091. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1095. 
 77. Amicus curiae included The Cato Institute, The American Civil Liberties Union, the 
Conductors Guild, The Music Library Association, Google, the Motion Picture Association of America, 
and many more.  See Docket File, SUPREME COURT UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-545.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 
2012). 
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“makes the public domain . . . a territory that works may never exit.”78  
Justice Ginsburg, the author of Eldred v. Ashcroft,79 wrote the opinion 
for the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor joined.80  Justice Breyer, who 
dissented in Eldred,81 wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito 
joined.82  Presumably, due to her involvement in the case as Solicitor 
General, Justice Kagan recused herself and took no part in the 
decision.83 
1. Justice Ginsburg’s Majority Opinion 
a. The Copyright and Patent Clause Claim 
The petitioners argued that Congress lacked authority to enact § 514 
under the Copyright and Patent Clause because the Clause erects “an 
impenetrable barrier to the extension of copyright protection to authors 
whose writings, for whatever reason, are in the public domain.”84  
Justice Ginsburg disposed of this constitutional argument by looking to 
the text of the Copyright and Patent Clause, historical practice, and 
Supreme Court precedents.85 
Looking at the plain language of the Copyright and Patent Clause, 
Justice Ginsburg rejected petitioners’ argument that § 514 violated the 
“limited times” provision because “removing works from the public 
domain . . . turn[s] a fixed and predictable period into one that can be 
reset or resurrected at any time, even after it expires.”86  Justice 
Ginsburg noted that the Court’s decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft was 
 
 78. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (“In accord with the judgment of the Tenth 
Circuit, we conclude that § 514 does not transgress constitutional limitations on Congress’ authority. 
Neither the Copyright and Patent Clause nor the First Amendment, we hold, makes the public domain, 
in any and all cases, a territory that works may never exit.”). 
 79. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 80. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877; see also Docket File, SUPREME COURT UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-545.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 
2012). 
 81. See Eldred, 537 U.S. 186. 
 82. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873; see also Docket File, SUPREME COURT UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-545.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 
2012). 
 83. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873; see also SUPREME COURT UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-545.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 
2012). 
 84. Golan, 132 S. Ct. 884. 
 85. Id. at 885. 
 86. Id. at 884. 
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“largely dispositive.”87  The Eldred Court held that the Copyright and 
Patent Clause “does not convey a meaning so constricted,” such that 
“the command that a time prescription, once set, becomes forever 
‘fixed’ or ‘inalterable.’”88  Justice Ginsburg found the petitioners’ 
construction of the “limited times” provision to “closely resemble[] the 
definition rejected in Eldred”89 and that petitioners failed to explain why 
the copyright terms granted to foreign works under § 514 are unlimited, 
especially in light of the fact that “the copyrights of restored foreign 
works typically last for fewer years than those of their domestic 
counterparts.”90  In an attempt to distinguish the § 514 copyright term 
duration from that in Eldred, the petitioners asserted that Congress sets 
the copyright term for foreign works excluded from U.S. protection to 
exactly zero, resulting in a “limited time [that] had already passed for 
works in the public domain.”91  Justice Ginsburg found “scant sense” in 
the petitioners’ argument, reasoning that in order for a limited time of 
exclusivity to run, it must first begin.92  The petitioners’ final argument 
under the limited times provision was that upholding § 514 would 
permit Congress to grant perpetual copyright protection, legislated in 
installments.93  Justice Ginsburg rejected this argument of Congress’ 
“hypothetical legislative misbehavior” finding that “Congress can hardly 
be charged with a design to move stealthily toward a regime of perpetual 
copyrights.”94 
Justice Ginsburg addressed petitioners’ “ultimate argument,”95 also 
aimed toward a limitation found in the text of the Copyright and Patent 
Clause, that § 514 fails to “promote the progress of science”96 because it 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 884–85. 
 90. Id. at 885.  In describing the impact of § 514 on foreign works previously in the public 
domain, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that § 514 included provisions to mitigate the harm to those 
parties who relied on such works.  See id. at 883.  Some mitigating actions include: (1) anyone remains 
free to copy and use restored works for one year following § 514’s enactment; (2) additional protections 
for reliance parties; and (3) parties who created “derivative works” may indefinitely exploit the 
derivation upon payment of the copyright holder of “reasonable compensation.”  Additionally, 
“[r]estored works . . . receive no compensatory time for the period of exclusivity they would have 
enjoyed before § 514’s enactment” causing their term to “fall[] short of that available to similarly 
situated U.S. works.”  Id. at 882. 
 91. Id. at 885. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (“Carried to its logical conclusion, petitioners persist, the Government’s position would 
allow Congress to institute a second ‘limited’ term after the first expires, a third after that, and so on.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 887–88. 
 96. As noted above, the Progress Clause of the Copyright and Patent Clause states that 
“Congress is empowered to ‘promote the progress of science and useful arts’ by enacting systems of 
copyright and patent protection.”  As Justice Ginsburg noted, “counterintuitively for the contemporary 
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“deals solely with works already created . . . [and thus] provides no 
plausible incentive to create new works.”97  Dismissing this assertion, 
“nearly identical to the one” rejected in Eldred, Justice Ginsburg 
reasoned that the creation of new works “is not the sole way Congress 
may promote knowledge and learning.”98  Turning once again to the 
precedential value of Eldred, Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court 
previously held that the “[Copyright and Patent Clause] empowers 
Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that . . . serve 
the ends of the Clause[,] . . .  [a]nd those permissible ends . . . extend[] 
beyond the creation of new works.”99  The Court found that inducing 
dissemination of new works, unlike inducing creation of new works, 
was an appropriate means for “promoting the progress of science.”100  
This was evidenced by prior legislation making “copyright contingent 
on publication.”101  
Although the Court held that incentivizing creation of new works “is 
not the sole means Congress may use under the [Progress Clause],” 
Justice Ginsburg found § 514 to incentivize both dissemination and 
creation of works.102  As for incentivizing the dissemination of works, 
“[a] well-functioning international copyright system” would likely do so 
by “expand[ing] foreign markets available to U.S. authors.”103  
Furthermore, the Court found that § 514, and thus full compliance with 
the Berne Convention, would incentivize creation of new works by 
“invigorat[ing] protection against piracy of U.S. works abroad, thereby 
benefitting copyright intensive industries stateside . . . .”104 
In addition to addressing the direct text of the Copyright and Patent 
Clause and the precedential authority interpreting it, Justice Ginsburg 
looked toward historical practice in finding that § 514 did not violate the 
Constitution.  First, the Copyright Act of 1790, the Act that launched a 
national system of copyright protection, granted copyright in works 
 
reader, Congress’ copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its patent authority, to the 
progress of the useful arts.”  Id. at 888. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 101. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888.  Justice Ginsburg looked toward evidence that at the time of the 
founding, inducing dissemination of creative works was a purpose of the Copyright and Patent Clause 
contemplated by the fathers of the U.S. Constitution.  See id.  Particularly, at the time of the founding, 
copyright protection was trained on “publication, not creation.”  Id.  Furthermore, “[u]ntil 1976, in fact, 
Congress made federal copyright contingent upon publication, thereby providing incentives not 
primarily for creation, but for dissemination.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 102. Id. at 889. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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previously in the public domain.105  Thus, Justice Ginsburg reasoned 
that “[t]he First Congress . . . did not view the public domain as 
inviolate.”106  Subsequent legislation that restored copyright or patent 
protection to works previously in the public domain were also 
considered persuasive evidence of historical practice supporting the 
enactment of § 514.107  Specifically, Justice Ginsburg cited unchallenged 
private bills that restored copyrights of works,108 analogous patent bills, 
upheld in litigation, that restored patent protection to inventions in the 
public domain,109 and “generally applicable legislation granting patents 
and copyrights to inventions and works that had lost protection.”110 
Finding this historical practice helpful required Justice Ginsburg to 
address the Supreme Court’s contradicting language in Graham v. John 
Deere Co. of Kansas City.111  Justice Ginsburg found the statement, 
“Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to 
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free 
access to materials already available,”112 to be dicta that “did not speak 
to the constitutional limits on Congress’ copyright and patent 
authority.”113  Instead, the Court found the passage to “address[] an 
invention’s very eligibility for patent protection.”114  Petitioners’ final 
argument attempted to show that Congress’ historical practice in 
granting copyright or patent protection to works previously in the public 
 
 105. Id. at 885–86 (“Before the Act launched a uniform national system, three States provided no 
statutory copyright protection at all.  Of those that did afford some protection, seven failed to protect 
maps; eight did not cover previously published books; and all ten denied protection to works that failed 
to comply with formalities.”). 
 106. Id. at 886. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id.  The latest of the private bills restoring copyright protection that Justice Ginsburg 
found in support of the Court’s holding was passed in 1896.  Id. (citing Act of Feb. 19, 1849 (Corson 
Act), ch. 57, 9 Stat. 763; Act of June 23, 1874 (Helmuth Act), ch. 534, 18 Stat. 618; Act of Feb. 17, 
1898 (Jones Act), ch. 29, 30 Stat. 1396). 
 109. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 886.  The latest of the private bills restoring patent protection that 
Justice Ginsburg found in support of the Court’s holding was passed in 1898.  Id.  See also Evans v. 
Jordan, 13 U.S. 199 (1815) (upholding the validity of a patent’s over a flour mill, and thus upholding the 
validity of the 1808 bill restoring patent protection); McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202 (1843) 
(enforcing an 1839 amendment recognizing a patent over an invention despite a prior use bar). 
 110. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887 (“An 1832 statute authorized a new patent for any inventor whose 
failure, ‘by inadvertence, accident, or mistake,’ to comply with statutory formalities rendered the 
original patent ‘invalid or inoperative.’  An 1893 measure similarly allowed authors who had not timely 
deposited their work to receive ‘all the rights and privileges’ the Copyright Act affords, if they made the 
required deposit by March 1, 1893.  And in 1919 and 1941, Congress authorized the President to issue 
proclamations granting protection to foreign works that had fallen into the public domain during World 
Wars I and II.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 111. 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
 112. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 113. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887. 
 114. Id.; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 202 n.7 (2003). 
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domain occurred only in extraordinary situations.  These situations 
included “[i]nstalling a federal copyright system and ameliorating the 
interruptions of global war.”115  Justice Ginsburg and the Court found 
that complying with the Berne Convention was therefore a “signal 
event.”116 
b. The First Amendment Claim 
As noted above, Justice Ginsburg similarly rejected petitioners’ claim 
that § 514 offended the First Amendment.117  The “pathmarking 
decisions in Eldred”118 once again proved largely determinative; Justice 
Ginsburg declined to apply heightened review to § 514 because it leaves 
untouched the “traditional contours of copyright protection,”119—the 
“idea–expression dichotomy” and the “fair use” defense.120  
Acknowledging that every grant of copyright protection inherently 
restricts expression, the Court further found that § 514 did not disturb 
“speech-protective purposes and safeguards embraced by copyright law” 
because “[i]t deferred the date from which enforcement runs, and it 
cushioned the impact of restoration on ‘reliance parties’ who exploited 
[works previously in the public domain].”121 
Justice Ginsburg squashed the petitioners’ attempt to distinguish their 
case from Eldred in order to achieve higher scrutiny under the First 
Amendment, thus “achiev[ing] under the banner of the First Amendment 
what they could not win under the Copyright [and Patent] Clause.”122  
The crux of the petitioners’ argument was that due to their unlimited and 
unfettered use of works previously in the public domain, they enjoyed 
vested rights in these works.123  Thus, since § 514 alters the public 
domain, it also threatens the petitioners’ “interests of a higher order” 
 
 115. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887. 
 116. Id.   
 117. See id. at 889.   
 118. Id. 
 119. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 120. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (“Due to this idea/expression distinction, every idea, theory, and 
fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of 
publication; the author’s expression alone gains copyright protection.”) (internal quotations omitted); 17 
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).  The fair use defense, codified at 17 U.S.C. §107, “allows the public to use not 
only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also the author’s expression itself in certain 
circumstances,” including but not limited to criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, and parody.  
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890. 
 121. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 891. 
 122. Id. (“Petitioners here attempt to achieve under the banner of the First Amendment what they 
could not win under the Copyright Clause: On their view of the Copyright Clause, the public domain is 
inviolable; as they read the First Amendment, the public domain is policed through heightened judicial 
scrutiny of Congress’ means and ends.”). 
 123. Id. 
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which demands heightened judicial scrutiny.124  Just like the Copyright 
and Patent Clause claim, Justice Ginsburg found 
“nothing . . . warrant[ing] exceptional First Amendment solicitude for 
copyrighted works that were once in the public domain.”125  Justice 
Ginsburg rejected any vested rights that petitioners’ claimed, reasoning 
that “no one, after the copyright term has expired, acquires ownership 
rights in the once-protected works.”126  Justice Ginsburg further found 
support in several instances of prior expansion to subject matter 
protectable under copyright law, each of which did not demand 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny.127  Thus, Justice Ginsburg 
rejected the petitioners’ attempt to solicit a finding that the public 
domain is inviolable by refusing to apply heightened judicial scrutiny to 
§ 514.  She instead held that the idea–expression dichotomy and the fair 
use doctrine sufficiently protected speech.128 
Thus, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s judgment refusing to 
“second-guess the political choice Congress made between leaving the 
public domain untouched and embracing Berne unstintingly.”129 
2. Justice Breyer’s Dissent 
As indicated by his emphatic disagreement with Justice Ginsburg’s 
arguments, Justice Breyer dissented, and found § 514 to be 
unconstitutional.130  Unlike Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer refused to 
separate the two claims, instead finding § 514 to violate the Copyright 
and Patent Clause interpreted in light of the First Amendment.  Justice 
Breyer believes that the Constitution should be interpreted “as a single 
document—a document that we should not read as setting the Copyright 
[and Patent] Clause and the First Amendment at cross-purposes.”131 
Justice Breyer began his dissent by advocating for a “utilitarian view 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 892. 
 127. Id. (“Congress broke new ground when it extended copyright protection to foreign works in 
1891; to dramatic works in 1856; to photographs and photographic negatives in 1865; to motion pictures 
in 1912; to fixed sound recordings in 1972; and to architectural works in 1990.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 128. See id. at 891. 
 129. Id. at 887. 
 130. See id. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. at 907–08 (“Nor need I advocate the application here of strict or specially heightened 
review.  I need only find that the First Amendment interest is important enough to require courts to 
scrutinize with some care the reasons claimed to justify the Act in order to determine whether they 
constitute reasonable copyright-related justifications for the serious harms, including speech-related 
harms, which the Act seems likely to impose.”). 
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of copyrights and patents,”132 one in which a copyright or patent may 
only be “conferred for a public reason—to elicit new creation.”133  In 
support of his view, Justice Breyer first looked to the history of 
copyright law, including the Founding Fathers’ view of the law’s 
underlying purpose.134  As Justice Breyer observed, the Framers were 
well aware of Great Britain’s Eighteenth Century copyright statute, the 
purpose of which was to “encourage [authors] to compose and write 
useful books.”135  The “cultural quid pro quo”—encouraging authors “to 
compose and write useful books [by] . . . provid[ing] a . . . right to print 
and reprint those works”—was the basis for colonial copyright statutes 
and the Copyright and Patent Clause.136  Even Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison supported a “limited conferral of monopoly rights only 
‘as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce 
utility.’”137  Though Justice Breyer sought to establish historical support, 
much like Justice Ginsburg for the majority, his utilitarian understanding 
of the Copyright and Patent Clause also finds support in more recent 
case law and congressional reports on copyright legislation.138  
Specifically, Justice Breyer cited five Supreme Court decisions and two 
House Reports, each arguing that the purpose of Copyright and Patent 
Clause is to “motivate the creative activity of authors [and inventors] by 
the provision of a special reward.”139  It was the failure of § 514 to 
 
 132. Id. at 901. 
 133. Id. at 900 (“The possibility of eliciting new production is, and always has been, an essential 
precondition for American copyright protection.”). 
 134. See id. at 901. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 379, 383 (J. Looney ed. 2009)) (emphasis omitted). 
 138. See id. at 902. 
 139. Id. at 902 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984); see also id. (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (Copyright embodies the view 
that “encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare 
through the talents of authors and inventors”)); Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (Underlying copyright is the understanding that “creative work is to be 
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad 
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts”)); Id. (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 
(“[M]onopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are . . . [not] primarily designed to provide a 
special private benefit.  Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may 
be achieved.  It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors . . . by the provision of a special 
reward.”)); Id. (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (The 
“constitutional command . . . ‘[to] promote the Progress of [Science and the] useful Arts’ . . . is the 
standard expressed in the Constitution and may not be ignored.”)); Id. (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. 
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States . . . lie[s] in the general benefits 
derived by the public from the labors of authors.”); see also id.  (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1494, at 2 
(1892) (The Copyright and Patent Clause says “nothing . . . about any desire or purpose to secure to the 
author or inventor his ‘natural right to his property.”)); Id. at 902–03 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 2222, at 7 
(1909) (The purpose underlying copyright and patent law is “that it will stimulate writing and 
16
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss3/7
2013] CASENOTE—GOLVAN V. HOLDER 1069 
“provid[e] any additional incentive for the production of new material,” 
while “so seriously restrict[ing] dissemination,” that led Justice Breyer 
to finding that the statute exceeded the Copyright and Patent Clause’s 
limits.140 
Justice Breyer pointed to two major ways that § 514 restricts the 
dissemination of creative works.141  First, works that were previously in 
the public domain may now require payment to the “restored copyright” 
holder in order to use.142  Furthermore, costs of determining whether the 
work is subject to § 514, including searching for the “restored 
copyright” holder and negotiating a licensing fee with the holder, 
“threaten to limit severely the distribution and use of those works.”143  
The University of Michigan presents a prime example of the burden 
these costs impose, where administrative costs would likely exceed $1 
million.144 
Justice Breyer recognized that “ordinary copyright protection also 
comes accompanied with dissemination-restricting royalty charges and 
administrative costs,” but found the restrictions caused by § 514 to 
“work special harm.”145  In addition to the burdens discussed above, 
according to Justice Breyer, removing copyrighted works from the 
public domain “reverses the payment expectations” of those who used 
such works.146  Additionally, Justice Breyer argued that § 514 abridges 
preexisting freedoms to speak by removing repeatable expression.147  
Finally, Justice Breyer claimed that the statute is “backward-looking” 
which poses a greater risk of “trying to help known beneficiaries” rather 
than the “not yet known” writer or musician who have yet to create their 
works.148  The “special harm” of the restriction led Justice Breyer to 
consider the reasons for passing § 514 to determine whether they 
constitute “reasonable copyright related justification for the serious 
harms.”149  Since the “statute does not motivate the creative activity of 
authors,” thus lacking any “significant copyright-related quid pro quo,” 
 
invention.”)). 
 140. Id. at 903 (emphasis omitted). 
 141. Id. at  904. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 905 (There are millions of “orphan works”—“older and more obscure works with 
minimal commercial value that have copyright owners who are difficult or impossible to track down.”). 
 144. Id. (“The cost to the University of Michigan and the Institute of Museum and Library 
Services, for example, to determine the copyright status of books contained in the HathiTrust Digital 
Library that were published in the United States from 1923 to 1963 will exceed $1 million.”). 
 145. Id. at 906. 
 146. Id. (“This statute . . . restricts . . . Americans’ preexisting freedom to use formerly public 
domain material in their expressive activities.”). 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. at 907. 
 149. Id. at 908. 
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Justice Breyer would find the serious harms unjustified, rendering § 514 
unconstitutional.150 
In explaining how § 514 “does not directly elicit any new 
production,” Justice Breyer discounted much of the majority’s 
support.151  Importantly, Justice Breyer dismissed Justice Ginsburg’s 
reliance on private bills and other statutes that retroactively granted 
protection to works previously in the public domain, finding it 
“farfetched”152 to analogize those statutes—enacted in special 
circumstances or for comparable equitable reasons—to present law.153  
Further illuminating the weakness of this “historical practice” that the 
majority found so persuasive, Justice Breyer emphasized that 
congressional practice actually shows the contrary—a “virtually 
unbroken string of legislation preventing the withdrawal of works from 
the public domain.”154  Justice Breyer further addressed the majority’s 
reasoning that the Progress Clause does not require creation of new 
works by emphasizing that “initial creation . . . is the special concern of 
copyright protection,” and regardless, § 514 confers copyright 
monopolies to “restored works” which restricts dissemination compared 
to a free market.155 
As Justice Breyer saw it, the Copyright and Patent Clause requires a 
utilitarian balance in which no copyright or patent monopoly may be 
conferred without the public benefit of incentivizing creation and 
invention156—something that § 514 failed to accomplish by 
“withdrawing material from the public domain, [thus] inhibit[ing] an 
important preexisting flow of information.”157 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 909. 
 153. Id.. (“But special circumstances, like wars, hurricanes, earthquakes, and other disasters, 
prevent the realization in practice of a reasonable expectation of securing or maintaining a preexisting 
right.  Private bills are designed to provide special exceptions for comparable equitable reasons.”). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 910 (“The Court has not, to my knowledge, previously accepted such a rational—a 
rationale well removed from the special economic circumstances that surround the non-repeatable costs 
of the initial creation of a ‘Writing.’  And I fear that doing so would read the Copyright Clause as if it 
were a blank check made out in favor of those who are not themselves creators.”); Id. (“This argument, 
whatever its intrinsic merits, is an argument that directly concerns a private benefit: how to obtain more 
money from the sales of existing products.  It is not an argument about a public benefit, such as how to 
promote or to protect the creative process.”). 
 156. See id. at 900. 
 157. Id. at 912. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Golan Furthers the Supreme Court’s Disappointing Treatment of the 
Public Domain 
Just nine years after the Court effectively opened up the door for 
Congress to prevent copyrighted works from entering the public domain 
in Eldred,158 Justice Ginsburg in Golan struck a second blow by 
rejecting the established view that the public domain is absolute.159  In 
doing so, the Court underestimated the importance of the inherent 
limitation of the Copyright and Patent Clause and relied on unpersuasive 
arguments supporting its reading. 
The Copyright and Patent Clause, as the only enumerated power to 
contain both an “ends” and a “means” clause,160 should be interpreted to 
limit Congressional power to grant copyrights and patents only when the 
progress in science and useful arts is promoted.161  In addressing the 
petitioners’ argument that § 514 is unconstitutional because it provides 
no incentive for authors to create new works,162 Justice Ginsburg failed 
to recognize that § 514 does not promote the progress of science.  First, 
the only suggestion that § 514 induces creation of new works is that it 
expands foreign markets and invigorates protection against piracy, thus 
inducing investment in the creative process.163  This reasoning fails, 
because when the United States became a member to the Berne 
Convention, it provided prospective copyright protection, unlike § 514 
which is a backward-looking statute.164  In other words, the works 
granted retroactive protection by § 514 have already been created, so no 
inducement can occur.  Additionally, though advocates of § 514 suggest 
 
 158. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (permitting the extension of copyright protection to 
existing works so long as the extension is not perpetual). 
 159. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 160. See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress 
as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1774 (2006).  The 
Copyright and Patent Clause contains a “to” and a “by,” an “ends” and a “means,” whereas all other 
clauses—such as “[t]o borrow money” or “[t]o regulate commerce”—only contain the “ends” clause.  
Id. 
 161. Id. at 1776 (addressing four interpretations of the Copyright and Patent Clause: the first 
regarding the Progress Clause merely as a preamble with no limitation on Congress’ power, the second, 
regarding the Progress Clause as a limitation of power, the third reads the Progress Clause as a grant of 
power and the “Exclusive Rights Clause” as a limitation on it, and the fourth reading the Copyright and 
Patent Clause to confer two separate powers).  Though Courts and commentators generally consider the 
Progress Clause to be a non-binding preamble and the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft explicitly 
did not consider the issue of whether the Progress Clause acts as a limitation because the petitioner’s 
conceded the point.  Id. at 1828. 
 162. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888. 
 163. See id. at 889. 
 164. Id. at 907 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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it is necessary to ensure that foreign countries extend retroactive 
copyright protection to U.S. works, this does not bolster the creative 
process.  As Justice Breyer suggested, it is an argument that “directly 
concerns a private benefit: how to obtain more money from the sales of 
existing products.”165  Furthermore, even accepting the Court’s reading 
that the primary purpose of the Copyright and Patent Clause may be 
satisfied by the dissemination of creative works, § 514 restricts 
dissemination instead of promoting it.  The very nature of works in the 
public domain is that they are subject to copying, which “is not always 
discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive 
economy.”166  On the other hand, the very nature of a copyright is that 
the author has an “exclusive Right to their respective Writings”167 in the 
form of a limited monopoly.  Thus, copyright protection normally 
restricts dissemination by preventing the free accessibility of works.  
Furthermore, as Justice Breyer points out, § 514 erects additional 
difficulties to dissemination by increasing administrative costs and 
royalties.168 
In justification of permitting Congress to copyright works that were 
once freely accessible in the public domain, Justice Ginsburg relied on 
antiquated legislation while ignoring historical practice.  The legislation 
that the Court cited should hardly be considered persuasive as evidence 
that public domain should be considered unbounded.  It is weak 
evidence to consider century-old private bills (legislation that applies 
only to an individual or a group of individuals169) as well as legislation 
passed in extraordinary situations (such as enacting a federal copyright 
and patent system and to address disruptions due to global war170) to be 
accurate measures of historical practice supporting § 514.  Though 
Justice Ginsburg considers § 514 to be a similar “signal event,” 
rendering such legislation as a benchmark of historical practice, actual 
Congressional practice behind the passage of § 514 suggests 
otherwise.171  Though the Berne Convention took effect in 1886,172 the 
United States did not become a party to the Convention until 1989.  
 
 165. Id. at 910. 
 166. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (quoting Bonito Boats, 
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989)). 
 167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 168. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 169. See id. at 886 (majority opinion) (Justice Ginsburg cited numerous private bills that restored 
copyright and patent protection to works and inventions previously in the public domain). 
 170. See id. (discussing the Copyright Act of 1790 and legislation passed to ameliorate the effects 
of global war on copyrighted works). 
 171. Id. at 887 (“Yet the TRIPS accord, leading the United States to comply in full measure with 
Berne, was also a signal event.”). 
 172. Berne Convention, supra note 39, at art. 1. 
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Furthermore, when the United States finally did become a party, 
“Congress adopted a minimalist approach to compliance with the 
Convention,” initially punting on the issue of retroactive protection 
embodied by § 514.173  Thus, although Congress eventually voted to 
enact the retroactive protection of § 514, it dragged its feet in doing so, 
much to the dismay of other Berne Convention members.174  Unlike as 
Justice Ginsberg suggested, such delay is not characteristic of a signal 
event, such as global war.  To the contrary, Congress’s consistent 
hesitation in enacting retroactive protection175 suggests that the passage 
of § 514 was contrary to historical practice, making Justice Ginsburg’s 
reliance on the discussed legislation unavailing. 
In giving excessive weight to such legislation, the majority 
overlooked the overwhelming trend of preventing works from leaving 
the public domain.176  Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg contradicted 
herself by distinguishing Graham177 immediately after supporting her 
conclusion on § 514 by describing a private bill that granted a patent on 
an invention despite the employer’s prior use of the invention.178  Justice 
Ginsburg found Graham’s passage—“Congress may not authorize the 
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge 
from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already 
available”179—to be dicta that speaks to “an invention’s very eligibility 
for patent protection” and not “constitutional limits on Congress’ 
copyright and patent authority.”180  She simultaneously found private 
bills restoring patent protection that “absent such dispensation, [prior 
use] would have rendered the invention unpatentable,” to be evidence 
that the public domain may be disturbed—evidence of constitutional 
limits on Congress’ authority.181  If the Court properly interpreted the 
language at issue in Graham, such private bills should be criticized for 
granting patent protection to ineligible matter, rather than used as a basis 
to find that the public domain is unbounded. 
The Court in Golan should have found § 514 to be unconstitutional 
 
 173. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 879. 
 174. Id. at 880. 
 175. Id. at 879 (Upon joining the Berne Convention’s implementation, Congress adopted a 
“minimalist approach” and “defer[ed] consideration until a more thorough examination of 
Constitutional, commercial, and consumer considerations [was] possible.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 176. See id. at 909 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 177. See id. at 887 (majority opinion). 
 178. See id. (discussing an 1839 amendment that recognized a patent on an invention despite its 
prior use by the inventor’s employer). 
 179. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
 180. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887 (emphasis added). 
 181. See id. (emphasis added). 
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by giving more consideration to the importance of the public domain.  
The utilitarian view of the Copyright and Patent Clause, in which 
copyrights and patents must only be granted if they elicit new creation 
or invention, is the most appropriate interpretation of the Clause, and 
should have been accorded more weight.  The text of the Copyright and 
Patent Clause,182 the historical context in which it was drafted,183 and the 
case law interpreting it, all provide support for the reading that § 514 
does not satisfy this purpose.184 
Section 514 fails to elicit creation of new works because it is a 
backward-looking provision, meaning that it grants copyright protection 
over works already created and in the public domain.185  This is 
especially the case when considering that works in the public domain, 
including those being removed, are often the foundation for further 
creativity.186  Thus, it is more likely that § 514 lowers incentive and 
motivation to author creative works by removing the number of works 
available to potential authors that would use those works as building 
blocks.  Assume, for instance, that the painting of Mona Lisa by 
Leonardo da Vinci was removed from the public domain via subsequent 
copyright protection.  This building block for future derivative works 
would no longer be freely accessible, lowering the motivation for 
authors to produce new works like Marcel Duchamp’s derivative work 
of Mona Lisa in L.H.O.O.Q.187  Though the Court found inducing 
dissemination as an appropriate means to promote science, the Court 
 
 182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 146 (1989) (“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation 
and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the 
‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”). 
 183. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 901 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 379, 383 (J. Looney ed. 
2009)); see also Oliar, supra note 160, at 1774 (2006) (Progress Clause operates as a limitation).  
 184. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 (“As we have noted in the past, the Clause contains both a 
grant of power and certain limitations upon the exercise of that power.”); Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 
(“Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites 
in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’  
This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.”) (emphasis added). 
 185. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 907 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 186. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (Defining “derivative work” as “a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which 
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.  A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, 
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 
‘derivative work.’”); Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 (“From their inception, the federal patent laws have 
embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation 
and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a 
competitive economy.”) (emphasis added). 
 187. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (Defining “derivative work”); L.H.O.O.Q., WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L.H.O.O.Q. (last visited Aug. 22, 2012). 
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mistakenly believed § 514 promoted dissemination.  As Justice Breyer 
acutely pointed out, § 514 increases administrative costs in determining 
whether a work is subject to copyright, as well as, costs related to 
negotiating a licensing agreement.188  Therefore, § 514 fails the quid pro 
quo requirement embedded in the Copyright and Patent Clause by 
lowering incentive to produce and disseminate new works. 
B. Golan’s Impact in Intellectual Property Law 
Strictly speaking, the Court’s holding in Golan v. Holder addresses a 
specific issue in copyright law, answering in the affirmative that 
Congress may extend copyright protection to works previously in the 
public domain.189  Golan’s impact will surely be felt the strongest in the 
copyright arena, but to consider the Supreme Court’s holding in such a 
narrow view would be to ignore intricate areas of overlap between 
copyright and patent law.  To the contrary, the effect of this decision 
will seep through to other areas of intellectual property law.190 
There are many overlaps between copyright and patent law that 
render the Golan decision applicable to both arenas.  First, Congress is 
empowered to enact federal copyright and patent laws by the same 
clause of the U.S. Constitution.191  Sharing the same constitutional 
foundation, that in which Congress may pass laws to “promote the 
progress of science and useful arts,” provides that copyright and patent 
law share the same purpose.  Specifically, “the economic philosophy 
behind the Copyright [and Patent] Clause is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
 
 188. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 907 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  There are millions of “ophan works”—
“older and more obscure works with minimal commercial value that have copyright owners who are 
difficult or impossible to track down.”  Id. 
 189. Id. at 878 (majority opinion) (“Neither the Copyright and Patent Clause nor the First 
Amendment, we hold, makes the public domain, in any and all cases, a territory that works may never 
exit.”). 
 190. The following sections will address the clear overlap between copyright and patent law, but 
Golan may likewise affect areas of trademark law as well.  Courts were once confused about whether 
trademark protection could be extended to subject matter previously protected by an expired copyright 
or patent.  See generally Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).  Although the TrafFix court appeared 
to permit the extension of trademark protection, it refused to resolve the question of whether the Patent 
and Copyright Clause prohibits a holder of an expired patent from claiming trade dress protection, 
stating that if trademark’s functionality doctrine fails to handle the issue, “that will be time enough to 
address the matter.”  TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35.  I believe Golan answers the “TrafFix Question,” 
permitting trademark protection to extend to subject matter of an expired copyright or patent.  After all, 
Justice Ginsburg rejected the argument that the “Constitution renders the public domain largely 
untouchable by Congress,” suggesting that Congress is acting within its constitutional limits when 
extending the Lanham Act to subject matter in the public domain.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 891. 
 191. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
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advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.”192  
The Supreme Court also acknowledged the shared similarities between 
the two areas of law, occasionally employing doctrines once specific to 
one area of law to the other.  For example, copyright law may, in part, 
thank federal patent laws for its doctrines governing inducing 
infringement193 and contributory liability.194 
Golan then treats the public domain of copyright and patent law 
equally, such that artists and inventors who utilize works in the public 
domain should be weary that their creations and inventions may be 
undercut by retroactive protection of such works.195  Though Congress 
and the Supreme Court have felt comfortable in extending copyright 
protection, proactively and retroactively,196 it is unclear whether they 
would be as committed to doing the same for inventions in the public 
domain.197 
Because the facts of Golan expose the dangers of treating the public 
domain with such disregard, consider the following situation in order to 
expose Golan’s potential impact on patent law.  Suppose that a company 
invents a new pharmaceutical drug, and obtains a patent protecting its 
novel compound.  However, after seven and one-half years, the 
company fails to pay the United States Patent and Trademark Office the 
appropriate maintenance fee,198 allowing the invention to advance to the 
public domain free for people to utilize.  Generic drug companies begin 
 
 192. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214 (2003) (“As we have explained, ‘the economic 
philosophy behind the Copyright Clause is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by 
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.’”); 
see also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 958 (The constitutionally-stated purpose of granting patent rights to 
inventors for their discoveries is the promotion of progress in the “useful Arts.”  Likewise, the purpose 
of granting copyrights to authors for their writings is the promotion of progress of science.). 
 193. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 194. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 195. It should be noted that federal patent law requires that an invention be novel, including that 
an invention not be previously used or on sale in this country.  35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).  Thus, if 
Congress were to enact retroactive protection to inventions previously in the public domain, it would 
need to exclude the application of § 102 to such works.  Copyright law does not contain a similar 
provision. 
 196. See Eldred, 537 U.S. 186; Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 197. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“[S]ometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts,’ the constitutional objection of patent and copyright protection.”); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) (“Patent protection is, after 
all, a two-edged sword.  On the one hand, the promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives 
that lead to creation, invention, and discovery.  On the other hand, that very exclusivity can impede the 
flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention, by, for example, raising the price of using 
the patented ideas once created, requiring potential users to conduct costly and time-consuming searches 
of existing patents and pending patent applications, and requiring the negotiation of complex licensing 
arrangements.”). 
 198. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(f) (2012). 
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expensive preparations for manufacturing, marketing, and selling the 
pharmaceutical, while other companies engage in research and 
development for additional scientific advancements that require its use.  
It seems like the patent system is working at its best, allowing the public 
domain invention to act as the building block of scientific advancement 
and economic competition.  However, because Golan suggests that 
Congress may retroactively extend copyright protection under § 514 for 
“failure to comply with U.S. statutory formalities,” 199 the logical 
inference is that Congress may retroactively extend patent protection for 
failing to pay a maintenance fee, undercutting the work and 
advancements made by those relying on the accessibility of the public 
domain. 
This hypothetical, as well as the discussion of the Golan decision, 
leaves authors and inventors in a very precarious position.  While the 
Supreme Court suggests that “copying is not always discouraged or 
disfavored,”200 and that “imitation and refinement through imitation 
are . . . the very lifeblood of an economy,”201 it has simultaneously 
granted Congress permission to disadvantage those who do. 
C. Ameliorating Golan’s Impact 
This Note primarily has addressed the damaging effect of Golan v. 
Holder on the public domain, suggesting that it should have been 
decided differently.  Thus, it is recommended that either Congress repeal 
§ 514 or that the courts reverse course and find § 514 to be outside of 
the scope of the Copyright and Patent Clause.  However, with the U.S. 
Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of congressionally 
enacted legislation, the recourse available for authors and inventors who 
employ public domain works appears slim.  Though we can now only 
hope that Golan does not stifle artistic creativity, technological 
advancement, and economic competition, Congress and the courts can 
still take actions to ameliorate Golan’s effect. 
Congress did make some attempts to reduce the burden imposed by 
§ 514, such as, imposing no liability for use of works prior to retroactive 
protection; allowing anyone to copy restored works for one year 
following enactment; permitting “reliance parties” to continue using a 
restored work until provided notice by the copyright holder of intent to 
 
 199. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 
104A, 109(a) (1994)). 
 200. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001). 
 201. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146, 156 (1989) (“[W]e 
have consistently reiterated the teaching of Sears and Compco that ideas once placed before the public 
without the protection of a valid patent are subject to appropriation without significant restraint.”). 
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enforce the copyright; and permitting authors of derivative works to 
exploit their works upon paying “reasonable compensation” to the 
copyright holder.202  Congress must go further, however, because these 
provisions are insufficient in light of the importance of the public 
domain in incentivizing the creation of artistic works and technological 
advancements.  Congress should enact legislation to permit reliance 
parties to freely exploit a restored work indefinitely.  Similarly, an 
author of a derivative work should not be forced to compensate the 
holder of the restored copyright for creating a work by building off of 
the public domain.  These provisions would strengthen the protections 
currently in place, and provide some sort of relief from the damage 
imposed by § 514. 
Courts are also in a position to mitigate the consequences of the 
Golan decision.  One way would be to recognize infringing uses of a 
restored copyright to be fair use.  Fair use is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107, 
which provides that fair use of a copyrighted work is not 
infringement.203  Expanding the umbrella of fair use to cover restored 
copyrights would acknowledge that exploitation of works once freely 
accessible, and only subsequently removed from the public domain, is 
more “fair” than the exploitation or works always under copyright 
protection.  The negative impact of Golan would be significantly 
lessened if courts apply this expansive interpretation of the fair use 
doctrine. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By permitting subsequent authors and inventors to build off of prior 
creative works and inventions, the public domain continues to play a 
vital role in our federal copyright and patent systems.  The Supreme 
Court in Golan v. Holder has struck a blow to the public domain by 
failing to appreciate the utilitarian approach to copyrights and patents, 
which recognizes that the Copyright and Patent Clause prohibits the 
extension of protection without eliciting creation or invention.  Though 
the Court’s decision has made it more challenging for the world’s next 
Steve Jobs, there is always hope that Congress and the courts will 
acknowledge the strain § 514 places on authors and inventors and take 
action to ameliorate its damaging effects. 
 
 202. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 883 (2012). 
 203. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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